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RESUMO 
Este artigo aborda as implicações de dar nomes ou títulos a obras de arte e imagens e como isso 
interfere na interpretação. Argumenta que nomear uma obra é uma ferramenta para a leitura, 
especialmente durante o desenvolvimento de teorias intuitivas sobre arte por crianças, tornando-se 
uma parte positiva no processo de interpretação estética. Apresenta um modo de categorizar a função 
de nomear a obra. Comenta os resultados iniciais de um estudo empírico, indicando que, para a criança, 
atribuir um nome para a imagem é tão importante quanto identificar a intenção do artista. 
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ABSTRACT 
It is only relatively recently that the Anglophone art-education community started publically to collate its 
communal body of research. There are at least three ways of getting art students interested in research. 
I focus on just one of the ways, and note that sometimes it may be most important to name to a picture, 
as an occasional tool to help visual interpretation. Especially during the development of someone’s 
intuitive theory of art. There is a question about what very young viewers intuitively try to interpret: (a) 
the meaning of the picture that they see, or (b) the artist’s idea of what the picture means. I put forward 
a way of sorting out a role for naming here:  initial results seem to indicate that for young children settling 
on a name for a picture is as important as identifying an artist’s intent. Of course, criteria might change 
with development, but it is always interesting to look at research into the origins of an intuitive theory of 
pictures. 
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Intuitive theories of art; naming pictures; art interpretation. 
“Art may seem to be in danger of being drowned by 
talk… Probably such a diagnosis is superficial” 
(ARNHEIM, 1954, p.1). 
There are some aspects of artworks that it might be a mistake to try and talk 
about. Maybe some matters are best settled just by looking intently at artworks. 
Remaining silent may be a great help to creative engagement. So in this article we too 
shall remain silent about matters that are best left just to looking at pictures, and talking 
about them afterwards. We shall deal only with matters that are usefully talked about 
in advance of looking at pictures, for that is a way of bringing some issues into the 
open in a most forceful way. This article concentrates on wherever putting a name to 
an artwork may become a positive part of the process of communicating pictorial 
meanings. For present purposes, a name may be regarded as being a very 
compressed caption.  
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Giving a name to an artwork was naturally one of the issues that arose in the 
first comprehensive English-language handbook of research in art education, 
published in 2004 (Eisner & Day, editors) and amounting to 879 pages of packed text.  
Whenever a handbook is published, it is always a sign of professional confidence. The 
editors noted at the outset that 2004 was a very recent date for such an achievement 
for an educational area, compared with, say, music education or curriculum studies. 
Better late than never: it was judged to be immensely important that students in art 
education be helped to become aware of a communal research history that they should 
be proud of. Perhaps some students think that research should be individual; and they 
might be wary of research in case their individual creativity becomes hindered by 
studying collective knowledge. That would be understandable, but it would not be a 
very helpful viewpoint for them to hold. Could it be the case that some students think 
that if they were to read research reports and talk about research, the result would be 
would just be a blanket of words that might suffocate their own productive and creative 
processes? Some thirty years ago, I came to the conclusion that that was a hypothesis 
about student resistance to learning about research that was worth looking at. So I did 
look at the issue, slowly and informally, in the following way.   
Background context: approaches to research  
During my years as an external examiner for art education courses, over a 
decade I developed the habit of asking each student whether being on the course had 
helped them personally in producing their own artwork. Fortunately, each taught 
course always came out very well from such investigation. From the way the students 
talked, it was always easy to build up a picture of the efforts made by the staff.  So the 
result of my questioning was that I did not get what I had expected: there was no 
common picture of research as a suffocating enemy of personal creative diversity. My 
initial hypothesis seemed to get no support, which was no bad thing. I also developed 
the habit of asking each student what they thought of art-education research as a 
common endeavour. Here, I got no unified picture, ever. So what I did get was the 
impression that students held no common and sustained concept of research as a 
being a device for building a body of scholarship open to all in art education. As I noted 
earlier in this article, it took until 2004 for a public handbook to push forward a bold 
assertion of a relation between education, research and scholarship. Research is a 
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tool for generating new ideas, for collecting evidence on the outcomes, and for building 
solidarity between diverse practitioners. One wants to encourage students to value 
research as a professionally-common tool which is designed to unite knowledge and 
investigation. How may it be done?  
There are many ways of presenting research to students. One way is to 
encourage discussions of issues separate from students’ own productions so as to 
encourage a perspective untouched by self-interest. That is to say, inspired by the 
approach taken in all the sciences, research questioning is presented as something 
interesting in its own right regardless of success and failure in the results. For example, 
one identifies an aspect of drawing that the students would not be tempted to do in 
their own productions, and then asks why another group of artists are always tempted 
to draw consistently oddly. Early examples of such research are in Freeman (1980), 
and were collected along with others by contributors to Freeman and Cox (1985). 
Briefly, the artists considered in those publications were young children. Children are 
perpetually surprising, and nowadays no-one feels apologetic about finding children’s 
drawings interesting and puzzling. A steady stream of books on children’s drawings 
appeared in the nineties onwards. It then became natural to move onto discussing 
whether we might find ways of adapting research into children’s drawings so that it 
works with aspects of adults’ drawings. An author who worked back and forth between 
the productions of children and of adults was John Willats (1997; 2005). No-one has 
yet done better than he did in his books at presenting a route into formulating what 
psychological drawing research can accomplish. Even more pleasingly, he left a few 
questions about drawing open for discussion and experimental investigation.  
A second approach to engaging a class with research is to identify research 
questions that touch students’ own interests. That is the converse of the first approach 
which tries to keep apart from students’ own interests. For example, why is it that in an 
art-soaked country such as Italy, most people still put “pictorial beauty” at the very 
bottom of their list of sources of beauty compared with “natural beauty” which they put 
at the top? Work by Ruggi and Gilli (2008) brought to light that intriguing fact. There 
are many questions about where the criteria of the viewing public may not match with 
artists’ assumptions. For example, why is it that so many of the viewing public become 
outraged at some harmless artworks? Are some important legal judgements of 
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photographs sensible? When might it be perfectly natural for viewers to get something 
out of viewing experience which the artist had not intended them to feel? Such topics 
were discussed by Freeman (2004) gathered under the title of aesthetic reasoning. 
The proposal is that amongst the important forms of reasoning that we undertake, 
aesthetic reasoning is natural to us, and deals with important matters. A recent 
advance in theorizing how we are enabled to undertake such reasoning has been 
presented by Bullot and Reber (2013). Their proposal starts with a puzzle: how is it 
that something puts together (a) a mentality with stable tendencies whose roots go 
back thousands of years, with (b) art with a history which changes fast and constantly? 
The authors’ solution, which sparked immediate controversy, was to suppose that 
there is a special way we have of looking at the world, a way they labeled “the design 
stance”. Perhaps it is true that the practice of art that students are invited to join does 
involve a special way of thinking which is natural to us and  which students can feel 
proud of fostering. Bullot and Reber’s fine proposal is not perfect. When they use the 
term “design stance”, they are using a term that is what is philosophically labeled 
“dispositional”. A normal disposition is something that has some endurance and some 
coherence, and the Bullot–Reber formulation still awaits cross-links being specified as 
binding together the strands of the stance (FREEMAN and ALLEN, 2013). Still, that 
just means that there is more work to be done, which is never an unwelcome prospect.  
A third way of beginning a discussion of research to start well outside the fields 
of art and art education. That approach may be thought of as orthogonal to the first two 
approaches, and it may encounter each of the first two approaches in the course of a 
discussion. The idea is that we can track how something from outside inevitably gets 
into art and art education, for better or for worse. The research question is how to 
understand the nature of that intrusive something, and why it gets in. The educational 
question is what we might recommend to deal with the intrusion. This third approach 
is what the rest of this article is about. The intrusion that it centers on is our tendency 
to put names to things.  
How naming gets into the picture 
Each of us has an inbuilt need to name things. That fundamental need often 
shows up clearly in a child’s first words before a child is even a year old. Associated 
with that is an inbuilt need to exchange the names we come up with. Exchanging 
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names for things is one of the two main ways we develop communicative skills that 
bind us socially together. The exchange of social-agreement words, such as “hello” 
and “nice” form the other great way into language. All children come to weld the two 
ways together in their development. The naming of things plays a gigantic role in every 
branch of education. Once art education established an identity as a separate strand 
of education, people came to argue over the way the fundamental need for naming 
penetrates art and art education. Does naming pictures help or hinder viewers’ freedom 
to interpret what they see? Do artists have a special right to decide what their pictures 
should be called? Are some titles better than others? Would it be best to make the 
pictures communicate their meanings for themselves, namelessly? Are captions really 
nothing more than over-expanded names, or are names just compressed captions? 
And so on. There is no reason to think that anything will ever put a stop to the debate.  
Nor should it. The debate brings issues to light in an especially vivid way. Everyone 
has views about language, and it is particularly easy to sustain discussion. The 
question is where to start? 
One starting point is given by the famous phrase “visual thinking” promoted by 
Arnheim (1969). Michael Parsons energetically championed the idea that involvement 
in a particular kind of art thinking requires and promotes “an indivisible interactive 
combination of visual and linguistic elements” (FREEMAN and PARSONS, 2001, p. 
89). A concept of “interpretation” is put at the centre of discussions about how we 
understand art. A serious viewer of a picture has a sort of responsibility to be willing to 
undertake an act of interpretation. Sometimes that will be easy to do, sometimes it will 
be difficult. There is no responsibility laid on the artist to make it as easy as possible 
for the viewer, but there may well be a bit of responsibility to make it possible for the 
viewer at least to engage interpretatively with the artwork. These are not mysterious 
matters. But as the years pass, it seems that both the psychology involved in such 
matters, and the philosophical aesthetics that underpins analyses, become more and 
more complex. Periodic simplifications are a good idea. One elegant simplification can 
be found in a piece by Goodman (1976). Goodman wrote about an imaginary case in 
which someone puts a name to a picture. The case can be considered from more than 
one angle, but the following is the simplest angle that serves the present discussion. 
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Cases of interpretation where naming may get involved 
Goodman’s case is one of putting a name to an uninterruptable picture. Here, 
the naming may be presented as the artist’s attempt to rise to the challenge of being 
helpful to a viewer. The reason why the viewer needs help is that the particular picture 
of Goodman’s is very minimalist, little more than a small mark on the picture surface. 
Giving the photographic mark a name “My black horse” is accurate enough, and 
Goodman used the example to point out that no question of truth or falsity really arises. 
To put the matter in the terms used above, what is central is that even with the name 
being given, the viewer cannot start an act of pictorial interpretation that will make much 
pictorial progress. In that sense, the artist has been a failure. Sure, we have to add that 
we can imagine other circumstances in which the artist might be a success. So, there 
might be a place for that particular a picture and title in the context of an exhibition 
about the experiences of seeing and knowing. But that just underlines the point that 
something is missing in merely putting together the uninterpretable picture and the 
simple title, something outside that particular pair -- such as a context to carry the 
burden of promoting a viewer’s interpretative act. But even that device of adding a 
context seems to fail to satisfy the analysis of Schier (1986). Schier insisted that a 
minimal mark simply fails the criterion of functioning as a picture:  because the mark 
fails to display any of the features by which we would normally recognize a real object. 
In that sense, the mark fails to convey pictorial realism (see Sartwell, 1994). In the 
present case, no-one who can recognize a black horse can see any distinguishing 
features in the tiny mark. So in a sense, we could suggest that the picture is to blame 
for the viewer being becoming disappointed, because the mark is simply too minimalist. 
I think that Schier’s position is immensely useful, and also immensely difficult to use 
productively. It is in fact easy to think of a situation in which the tiny mark would be 
perfectly pictorially satisfying. To do that, let us return to a concept of “context” but this 
time let us imagine a context for the mark within the picture itself. How about adding a 
few horses, the foreground horses clearly recognizable, and then adding a few more 
horses which are drawn receding into the distance until the pictorially furthest one or 
two are just little marks? The marks would gain their satisfying pictorial meaning that 
becomes carried from the front of the scene to the little marks at the back. That is, 
communication of the meaning would be a success as long as the viewer co-operates 
in the interpretation, being willing to accept that distance in the scene is represented 
129 
 
at a price, the price of losing iconicity in the separate marks. And here just a few words 
given as a compressed caption can play a strongly helpful role in getting a co-operative 
interpretative process going.  
Let us generalize: the suggestion is that it is worth while taking more care over 
captions and titles than they usually seem to be given by artists. Many titles seem to 
be given by an artist or a collector merely as a means of labeling artworks in order 
simply to identify them afterwards. Sure, an identifying function is one of the crucially 
important functions fulfilled by naming, and the function works well in cases of art-
historical importance, such as Mona Lisa, Rokeby Venus, Night Watch, and so on. But 
that identifying-function, necessary though it be, is not sufficient to go anywhere near 
settling some problems of viewer disagreement and controversy. Names which may 
perhaps be significant in art history may fall communicatively flat when viewers become 
upset by artworks. The reason why viewers became upset by Carl Andre’s Equivalent 
VIII was that the artwork appeared to break some kind of implicit contract which viewers 
had come to believe in. In presenting Equivalent VIII as a finished artwork, the artist 
had hidden signs of any artistry without communicating what intent was served by that. 
The artist had hidden the artwork beneath a sample of a real scene of building 
materials without communicating what intent was served by such a presentation. 
Indeed, the title Equivalent VIII seemed merely to serve an identifying function within 
the artist’s closed world: instead of serving the communicative function wanted in the 
open world of public viewing. It would be good to understand what is going on in the 
many cases of controversy, dispute, misunderstanding, disappointment, and outrage 
that mark the course of art. We need to find out how putting names to artworks has 
effects within a communicative relation between artist and viewer when things go 
wrong as well as when things go well (see Freeman, 2004).  Perhaps many cases of 
viewer discontent may be traceable to the act of naming being restricted to serving 
only an identifying function or only a social function rather than welding the two together 
as we intuitively do from very early childhood.   
Viewers’ misunderstandings, disappointments, and outrage have their 
counterparts in honest misjudgements on the part of artists or curators, as well as in 
some artists’ act of mischief or desire to shock or to put transgression on display. 
Indeed, we earlier traced this account of naming to  Goodman’s very mild act of 
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mischief in displaying an unrecognizable picture which he claimed to be of his horse. 
Goodman was playing with the idea of deliberately putting a strain on viewers’ 
expectations and willingness to co-operate in an act of interpretation. We noted above 
that Goodman did not give any systematic consideration to contextual factors. In the 
latest attempt to work out a model of how artistic judgement might work, Bullot and 
Reber (2013) built in a process of contextual monitoring. Indeed, they argued 
repeatedly in their long article that context plays a crucial role in the process of unifying 
psychological and art-historical accounts to develop what they term a “design stance”. 
One of their examples of the importance of art historical thinking in passing a 
judgement on a picture, concerns an artist who added a knife-slash to his own picture, 
intending it to be an integral part of the meaning of the artwork as a whole. If one did 
not know the artist’s intent, and if one did not know some aspects of art history, would 
one get the picture wrong as a viewer? The answer is “yes”. Why would a viewer get 
it wrong?  Because the knife-slash mimics an act of vandalism that might be 
perpetrated by a very annoyed viewer. I suggest that a key question has to be whether 
it matters if a viewer misinterprets the picture. After all, there is no reason why an artist 
should not vandalise his own picture: the number of pictures damaged or destroyed by 
their own artists must run onto the many thousands by now. Sometimes it is of 
immense importance to know who damages a picture, and why; and sometimes it is a 
trivial matter: the picture is damaged and that is that. And that is where the act of 
naming and captioning comes into its own as an act of artistic communication. A title 
for an imaginary auto-vandalised picture such as, say, “Blue poles with knife-slash” 
would fulfill the bargain with the viewer which Goodman’s imaginary horse was probing. 
It would put the viewer in the position of starting to make an intelligent interpretation 
and evaluation of the artwork. The important thing is that the viewer should be enabled 
to start visual thinking: whether or not the viewer goes beyond the start and carries the 
act of interpretation to a triumphant conclusion is a very different matter. Here we have 
been concerned mostly with the starting of an interpretative process. 
One objection to all the writing above might be that serious matters have been 
presented superficially, and trivial issues have been presented solemnly. Does any of 
it matter in the real world of art education? The answer is that it all does matter 
immensely when one considers the child-development dimension of art understanding. 
It is with children that the issues above become urgent in a very simple form. Especially 
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at the beginning, in preschool children, and towards the end of childhood with 
adolescence. Adolescents are liable to become particularly judgemental: they may 
spontaneously regard it as their right to pass one-sided judgement on someone’s taste 
from the pictures displayed in the home (MARIDAKI-KASSOTAKI and FREEMAN, 
2000). And the adolescents may get things badly wrong if they lack awareness of 
contextual pressures and opportunities, such as what display-pieces the neighbours 
might have on their walls and how much money the person has to spend on pictures 
for the home. An adolescent rush to judgement was neatly documented by Turner 
(1983). The rush can only be halted by well-chosen words. In the case noted by Turner, 
no-one had explained to the adolescent viewers what the term “Fauve” meant. Perhaps 
if the term had been explained, the adolescents would have understood that what they 
interpreted as carelessness in the way that Derain had applied colours to the picture 
surface was a product of the artist intent. And that returns us to the knife-slash instance 
cited by Bullot and Reber that we noted above. Does a simple appeal to the fact of an 
artist intent validate an artistic judgement? That is rather a tedious question for 
philosophical aesthetics, but it is a live problem for young children, and it is still, 
surprisingly enough, a live issue within one strand of the experimental psychology of 
picturing, as follows.  
Naming and intending  
The relation between a picture and an artist’s intent is usually analysed as 
though it were a one-way relation, running from (a) an intent to cause some effect, into 
(b) the actual effect of the picture. That is, the artist intends something and that intent 
then explains something of why and how the picture then takes a particular form. So, 
Goodman intended to take a photograph of his horse and he then stood too far away 
from the horse. When looking at the picture, the viewers may then intuitively try to put 
something of their reaction to the picture into words (e.g. something like “It looks like a 
black horse in the distance so that that explains the appearance of the picture; and 
explaining the appearance of what I see is what I was trying to do”).  But what Bloom 
and Markson (1998) proposed is that there is a sense in which the process runs in 
reverse. That is rather than using focusing all our viewing intelligence on interpreting 
the picture, we also use the appearance of the picture to interpret something of the 
mind of the artist: “Children might call a picture that looks like a bird ‘a bird’ not merely 
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because it looks like a bird, but because its appearance makes it likely that it was 
created with the intent to represent a bird” (BLOOM and MARKSON, 1998, p. 203).  In 
an attempt to make sense of a world run by others the young children become skilful 
at seeking out cues to what intentions other people have. In that respect, the picture is 
just a possible cue to intention. That formulation indeed reverses the usual story in 
which a statement of intent is a possible cue as to the meaning of a picture.  
It is a lovely story: an artist naming a picture tells you something of what you 
might see in the picture, and seeing something in a picture tells you something of the 
mental state of the artist. A viewer engaged in an act of interpretation might work 
backwards and forwards along an intention-appearance track (see e.g. Browne & 
Woolley, 2001). But the story overlooks one thing. A common way in which we work 
from what is in the picture to what is in the artist’s mind is by putting a name to the 
picture. And it is no accident that the way in which we work from the artist’s mind to the 
picture is by putting a name to the artist’s intent. The name “My Black Horse” is what 
Goodman used in his brief example of the problem of naming and the problem of 
appearance. Can we ever separate out the effect of naming from the effect of clarifying 
an intention? It is not hard to start separating name from intent. Susanna Price, Katie 
Eaton and I adapted a well-known children’s game called “dot-to-dot”.  We showed 
four-year-olds some dots on a page and we then drew a continuous line connecting 
the dots. We then delightedly claimed that we recognized shape that appeared, and 
we then named it, e.g. “A Mouse”, or “A Balloon on a String”, whichever was pictorially 
plausible for that particular picture. We then asked each child each time whether they 
agreed with the name. They always said yes. We then asked if we could change the 
name, to e.g. “A Rat” or “A Lollipop on a Stick”.  Half the children said “no”, the name 
could not be changed. Apparently, once the name had been given, it stuck. Note that 
the name had been given only after we had done the drawing. So the name could not 
have labelled any prior intent of our own.  Does that take the result out of bounds of 
the argument of Bloom and Markson? In our study the name is not a cue to artist 
intention because the name was only given after the picture was finished. Why then 
did the name stick to the picture? Clearly, giving a name is a powerful event when you 
are a young child trying to develop your understanding of the world; and developing 
some theory of the pictorial realm which will not contradict too badly your emerging 
theory of the world. Why did half the children refuse to let us change the name even 
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though it was perfectly plausible in pictorial terms, and half the children allow us to 
change the name? One cannot tell, not from just one study. We need to develop the 
work, to make it certain that no picture can be seen until the very end of drawing, and 
that the child accepts our expression of surprise when the drawing is done. And 
perhaps there is an element of chance in the results, as with all empirical studies. Be 
all that as it may, it is interesting to see how easily a line of research opens itself. And 
that is what one wants to share with students.  
To end: I am not suggesting that our empirical study was a sort of contest, a test 
of the power of a statement of intent versus the power of a name. What researchers 
such as Bloom and Markson and we started to unearth is the way in which the young 
viewer’s search for meaning embraces picture and mind and word. There is no reason 
at all to think that the child’s intuitive theory of pictures becomes any less complex and 
deep as she develops sensitivity to the role of the artist (see e.g. Callaghan & Rochat, 
2003). Viewers bring a rich interpretative stance with them to the world of art. Whilst it 
is true that in the end all we can do is to stare at a picture and hope that it will speak 
to us on its own, we cannot stop searching for and picking up all sorts of cues and 
mental tools along the way. One mental tool is communicatively to share a name with 
others. Nominal agreement binds our sensibilities together.  
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